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was perfect, nor that there is no room for
improvement in American life. It is clear
in his memoir that he has found life better
here than anywhere else he has been. But
he also warns that this life can only be kept
so by vigilance against all forms of tyranny
over mind, body, and spirit.

a critical account of what is actually there,
beginning with Spencer’s aims, proceeding
through his means and ending with his
casuistical claims. Spencer set himself two
aims in writing The Principles of Ethics.
Providing a scientific basis for ethics was
the first. The second was to point out
where the concrete injunctions of tradiReviewed by WALTER
TROHAN tional morality were incomplete or in error. Ethics can be. “scientific” in several
senses. To fulfill his first aim, Spencer
wanted to derive,an ethics that was “scientific” in two. The supernatural basis of
ethics had, Spencer thought, irretrievably
lost its authority. If society was to avoid the
disaster of lacking a code of ethics, a new
Spencer’s Tragedy
code would have to be developed on a nonThe Principles of Ethics, by Herbert
supernatural basis. Thus ethics was first to
Spencer, Indianapolk, Ind. : Liberty
be “scientific” in the sense of having its
Press, 1978. Volume 1, 613 pp.;
source in nature rather than the superVolume 2, 521 pp. $18.00 f o r the set.
natural. Secondarily, ethics was also to be
“scientific” in that the method for justifying injunctions in ethics should parallel
AT DINNER WITH Huxley, Spencer mentionthat for justifying laws in natural science.
ed that he had once written a tragedy.
According to Spencer’s conception of
Huxley immediately replied that he knew
scientific method, science proceeded first
what the plot must be: a beautiful theory
from inductions that yielded “vague but
gets murdered by a nasty fact. Spencer
partially true notions,” then to generalizahimself delighted in retelling Huxley’s
tions derived by abstract reasoning that
barb, displaying thereby both his goodomits “qualifying circumstances,” and
humor and self-awareness. What he was
finally to a full system that takes account of
probably not aware of was that he actually
the previously omitted qualifying cirdid write a tragedy with Huxley’s plot. In
cumstances. Though this may be the order
The Principles of Ethics the beautiful
for discovering scientific rules of conduct,
theory is that an individual’s conduct is to
it is not the order he uses in the presentabe judged by how well it furthers the intion of those rules in his Principles. The
dividual’s survival. The nasty fact is that
book is divided into six parts: the first
much conduct that furthers survival is
devoted to fairly abstract reasoning about
morally repugnant both to Spencer and to
the criteria for judging conduct; the semost civilized people. Like many a good
cond devoted to anthropological inducdoctor, Spencer operated on the theory in
tions concerning various ethical issues; and
order to save it from the attack of the fact.
the last four returning again to abstract
After the operation, the theory was so
reasoning, but here directed toward
disfigured by qualifications and inconestablishing more concrete ethical injuncsistencies that few people paid attention to
tions. The divergence between the order of
it, preferring to remember it as it was in its
discovery and the order in presentation is
original pure simplicity.
probably due to Spencer’s fear that he
If fairness to a n author means
would not live to finish the whole work.
remembering what he actually wrote, with
What Spencer wrote first and what appears
all the qualifications and inconsistencies,
as the first part of the Principles is what
then posterity has not been fair to Spencer.
Spencer considered most important - the
The best way to redress the wrong is to give
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abstract derivation of the general criteria
for evaluating conduct.
To evaluate Spencer’ssuccess at giving a
scientific basis to ethics it is easier to consider the parts of the work in the order he
prescribed as scientific rather than the actual order of presentation. Begin, then,
with the part of the book called “The Inductions of Ethics.” Here Spencer attempts
to learn what ethical conduct is in regard
to broad topics, such as aggression,
generosity, and temperance, by comparing
the conduct of primitive societies with that
of advanced societies. Any conduct that is
absent in primitive societies but present in
advanced is good, while the opposite is
bad. As noted earlier, Spencer claimed
that induction in science yields only vague
notions. Whether or not Spencer’s claim is
true in general, it certainly is true of his
own inductions in the Principles. For the
most part each of the chapters consists of
many pages devoted to summaries of the
practices of diverse cultures, followed by a
page or two devoted to the moral of the
srary. T h e ethnngaphic materia! is
fascinating in its own right, but often has
little relevance to the morals which are instead briefly defended by abstract reasoning about what sort of conduct would promote a developed society. No matter what
conduct Spencer’s reasoning approves, he
finds support in the ethnographic data. If
bad conduct, such as cannibalism, is performed by primitives, then this confirms
that the conduct is bad. If good conduct is
performed, such as restraint in childbearing among the Figians and the MotuMotu, then this confirms that the conduct
is good since “even they” do it. Either way,
the ethnographic data “supports” what
Spencer believes for other reasons. The
weakness of the method of the inductions is
nowhere clearer than when Spencer loses
patience with the imperialism of England.
Looking around him he saw “...a state of
the world in which naked barbarians and
barbarians in skins are being overrun by
barbarians in broadcloth.”
Spencer himself recognized to some extent the weakness of the inductions. The

portion of the Principles that he preferred
was the more abstract part in which he
derived and defended his criteria for
evaluating conduct. He begins by discussing a criterion that is commonly associated
with his name: that conduct is to be judged
by how far it lengthens or shortens the
lifespan of the agent. This criterion,
however, is quickly rejected by Spencer
because it would have required him to
judge as more advanced, creatures he
believed clearly to be more primitive. For
instance, “an oyster, adapted by its structure to the diffused food contained in the
water it draws in, and shielded by its shell
from nearly all dangers, may live longer
than a cuttlefish, which has such superior
powers of dealing with numerous contingencies...” In deference to the cuttlefish, Spencer concludes that conduct is
to be judged according to its impact on
both the length and breadth of life, where
“breadth” means the number of different
activities the organism can perform.
As the first and most fundamental of
Snenrer’g three critpriz, the “lenmth Qnrl
-r---------e--breadth of life” criterion merits special attention. Even assuming that it is possible to
obtain some measure of the number of activities an individual can perform, there
still remain a couple of fundamental problems with the criterion. The most crucial
problem is that nothing in nature implies
that a variety of activities is better or more
advanced than the lack of such variety. As
Spencer himself notes, simple creatures
often survive longer than the more complex. A person may prefer simplicity to
variety without being incoherent and there
is nothing in evolution (at least nothing
noted by Spencer) that implies that such a
person is wrong. Like the magician pulling
the rabbit from a hat, Spencer only gets
from evolution what he has first put into it.
Part of the appeal of the “length and
breadth” criterion for Spencer was his impli& belief that the criterion directly implies the superiority of advanced society.
The implication, however, is not direct. It
requires the missing assumption that in an
advanced society each individual performs
--I-
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a greater variety of activities than in a
primitive society. The assumption may be
true, but it is by no means obvious. It
would be false, for instance, if specialization resulted in each individual performing
fewer different activities even though in the
society as a whole, more different activities
were being performed. Oster and Wilson
in their recent Caste and Ecology in Social
Insects claim that, for many individual
non-social insects, the variety of activities
performed is equal to that of an entire colony of social insects. As a result each individual colony member performs a
smaller variety of activities than does the
individual non-social insect. Thus, even
assuming the soundness of the “length and
breadth” criterion, Spencer still needed to
defend, not just assume, the superiority of
modem specialized societies.
On the sole basis of the length and
breadth of life criterion, Spencer would
have been unable to praise much conduct
that he thought good and blame much
conduct that he thought bad. The expedient, of course, is to add two more
criteria. Thus his second criterion is that
good conduct furthers the survival of the
species through the procreation and nurture of healthy, able offspring, while the
third criterion is that good conduct involves “mutual help.” If the first criterion
might be thought to follow from nature,
the latter two are more transparently ad
hoc. In any ethical dilemma that people
seriously worry about, these criteria can be
used to justify either course of conduct. A
once beautiful theory has been qualified
into vacuousness.
The ambiguity of the inductions from
ethnology and the ad hocness of the deductions from nature doom Spencer’s attempt
to give ethics a new authority in science.
Failure in this first aim implies that only
limited success could be had in achieving
the second: without securely grounded

criteria for judging conduct Spencer could
not with moral force show where the concrete injunctions of traditional morality
were incomplete or in error. What he
could and did do was to lay out with
remarkable perceptiveness the consequences of various modes of conduct.
Entertaining, as well as edifying, are the
discussions in praise of variety in food and
travel and the discussions in blame of excess fiction reading and overcultured
women. Also engrossing are the frequent
references to the exotic both in people and
in animals. Of more serious value are the
frequently incisive critiques of the positions
of the positions of others. Outstanding in
this regard is his discussion of the incoherence of pure altruism. On a more
rhetorical level, he is also effective in arguing against the hypocrisy of the Christians
who advocated imperialism and war.
This new edition of thefiinciples follows
the text of the 1897 edition published by D.
Appleton and Company. As is usual with
the products of Liberty Press, the quality
of the paper and binding is high, the price
low. Tibor Machan’s brief introduction is
useful, though he may confuse the casual
reader when he describes as “egoism”
Spencer’s avowed compromise between
egoism and altruism. Even if the Principles
is properly described as a failure it would
be wrong to be too critical of its author.
Spencer did not fail because he was stupid,
ill-informed, or malign. On the contrary,
the pages of the Principles display a lively
intelligence, a wealth of empirical
knowledge, and a good-natured humanity.
Rather Spencer failed because his task was
so difficult. The Princzjdes should thus be
of interest not just to historians of thought
but also to all those who would themselves
take up Spencer’s task.
Reviewed by ARTHURM. DIAMOND,
JR.
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